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Supreme Court Review
defamation must be tried before a jury, except by agreement of the
parties. The majority of defamation actions would thus be heard before
a jury, since most defendants would be unwilling to voluntarily give
the plaintiff procedural advantage. The inferance from this is that
actions which might ordinarily be heard by judge alone would now
be heard before a jury, resulting in a longer delay and higher trial cost,
both of which are undesirable side affects.
As things stand at present, the discretion of the court to postpone
the rebuttal of justification is limited to a minority of actions.
Jerome v. Anderson may be looked upon as only widening the accepted
use of this procedural discretion to encompass the non-jury action
where prior evidence is given by the plaintiff. With regard to an
action before a jury where the plaintiff gives prior evidence, Judson
J., in Jerome v. Anderson,19 stated in his dissent that to postpone the
rebuttal by the plaintiff would have been an error so serious as to
warrant a new trial being ordered. This strong dissent, in obiter, could
not be ignored in future defamation actions, and indications are that
this procedure would not be available under these circumstances. On
the whole, the discretionary alteration of procedure has little to sup-
port it in terms of logic, and to limit it to actions where no prior evi-
dence has been brought by a plaintiff offers the best alternative. How-
ever, it would appear from the Jerome v. Anderson decision that its
recognized use has now been broadened.
Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada [1964] S.C.R. 85.
G. W. D. MCKECHNiv-*
NEGLIGENCE - TNVITOR AND INVITEE - UNUSUAL DANGER - FAILURE
TO USE REASONABLE CARE - DEFENCE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA.
Since the decision in London Graving Dock Co. v. Horton,' there
has been some doubt as to the scope of an occupier's duty to an invitee.
Two of the contentious issues have been; (a) whether an objective or
subjective test should be used in ascertaining what is meant by an
"unusual danger", and (b) the relevance of an invitee's knowledge of
such a danger in discharging the invitor's duty to the invitee. Recently
these issues were considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
case of Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada.
2
In that case the plaintiff, a customer of the defendant bank,
slipped and fell in some water which had collected around the teller's
wicket. Snow had been tracked inside the bank and had melted,
19 Supra, footnote 1 at 311.
*Mr. McKechnie is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1951] A.C. 737; [1951] 2 All E.R. 1.
2 (1963), 46 W.W.R. 79; 43 D.L.R. (2d) 341; [1964] S.C.R. 85.
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creating water puddles. The plaintiff had been aware of the pres-
ence of the water but did not have full knowledge of the danger,
a distinction which the court raised. It found that the plaintiff had
walked "gingerly" and that the bank had provided a rubber mat
occupying the entire vestibule. The Supreme Court of Canada, uphold-
ing the trial decision3 and reversing the Court of Appeal of Manitoba,
4
split three to two5 in finding the bank liable for the damages caused to
the plaintiff.
There was no dispute that the relationship between the parties
was that of invitor-invitee. The question raised in the appeal was
whether the bank had discharged its duty to the appellant. Essentially
the problem was to interpret the requisite standard of care.
Spence J., speaking for the majority of the Court, quoted the
classic statement made by Willis J. in Indermaur v. Dames:
And, with respect to such a visitor at least, we consider it settled law that
he, using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled to
expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to prevent
damage from unusual danger which he knows or ought to know.6
The question thus raised was what was meant by an "unusual danger".
In deciding that "unusual" should be used in an objective sense, Spence
J. applied the words of Lord Porter in the Horton case:
I think 'unusual' is used in an objective sense and means such danger
as is not usually found in carrying out the task or fulfilling the function
which the invitee has in hand, though what is usual, will, of course, vary
with the reasons for which the invitee enters the premises. 7
Reference was also made to what Freedman J. A., when speaking for
the minority in the Court of Appeal, had said:
One does not normally expect that bank premises, to which members of
the public customarily resort in large numbers, will be wet and therefore
hazardous.8
Spence J. also felt that the ease and economy with which the condition
on the floor could be removed should also determine whether such a
condition was "unusual".
Spence J. felt that in applying the above tests, the state of the
floor did constitute an "unusual danger".
On the question whether the bank exercised reasonable care to
prevent damage from this unusual danger, Spence J., after reviewing
the conduct of the defendant, held that the bank had failed to use
3 The trial judge was Maybank J.
4 (1963), 41 W.W.R. 91; 37 D.L.R. (2d) 725. (Freedman and Monniner
J.J.A. dissenting).
5 Judson, Hall and Spence J.J. for the majority (Martland and Ritchie
dissenting).
6 (1886), L.R. I C.P. 274.
7 [19513 A.C. 737 at 745.
8 [1964 S.C.R. 85 at 96, referring to 37 D.L.R. (2d) 725.
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reasonable care to prevent damage to its customers, including the
plaintiff whom the bank could expect to frequent its premises. 9
The next question considered was whether the plaintiff's knowl-
edge was sufficient to discharge the bank's duty to take care. At the
trial it had been proved that the plaintiff had been aware of the wet
condition on the floor but that she had not fully appreciated the danger
in the area of the teller's wicket and therefore she had not been
sciens. Spence J. said, that "the defendant has failed to show such
knowledge as to leave the inference that the risk had been voluntarily
encountered". 0 But, more important than this to the decision, an
implication was made that, even if the plaintiff had been sciens, this
would not have been enough to discharge the duty. Reference was
made to the decision of Cartwright J. in Lehnert v. Stein where he
said:
... the burden lies upon the defendant of proving that the plaintiff,
expressly or by necessary implication, agreed to exempt the defendant
from liability for any damage suffered by the plaintiff occasioned by
that negligence.
Spence J. could not find anything in this case to indicate that the
plaintiff consented to absolve the defendant from this duty to take care.
Thus, the effect of the CampbelZ case is to uphold the view taken
in the Horton case that an objective test should be used in ascertaining
whether a certain condition is an unusual danger. That is, taken from
the view of a reasonable person in the position of an occupier with
knowledge he has or ought to have of (a) the capacity of the invitee or
(b) the capacity of the class to which he belongs.12 Also the Campbell
case implies that the Court will no longer follow the idea expressed
in the Horton case that an invitee's knowledge of the danger will neces-
sarily discharge the invitor's duty of care, but will follow the rationale
of Lehnert v. Stein. Where the plaintiff clearly did not have full knowl-
edge of the danger in circumstances leading to an inference that she
had voluntarily assumed the risk, the defendant's duty of care is not
discharged.
9 [1964] S.C.R. 85 at 97.
10 [1964] S.C.R. 85 at 99. On this point Spence J. refers to Letang v. 0 Hawa
Electric Railway Co. [1926] A.C. 725. That case should be distinguished from
the present case on the facts. In the Letang case, the plaintiff was aware of
the danger but had no alternative but to walk over the ice, i.e., there was no
voluntary asumption of risk
11 [1963] S.C.R. 38 at 43; 36 D.L.R. (2d) 159; see also (1964) Osgoode Hall
L.J. 229 where A. Scace said, "It is submitted by the writer that the defence of
volenti has outlived its usefulness. The doctrine of contributory negligence
can absolve a defendant from any liability whatsoever, and also has a far
greater degree of flexibility. It is readily apparent that the courts are loathe
to apply the doctrine as is evidenced by the instant case. In addition the test
for its application is quite unreal. In the absence of an express bargain, or
active encouragement by the plaintiff the inference is almost never drawn and
therefore the defence ought to be abolished as a useless appendage to the law
of torts".
1-2 This aspect of the Horton case is discussed in an article, Significant
Developments in the Law of Occupier's Liability (1964), 42 Can. Bar Rev. 607
at 608.
1965]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
It is apparent that the law with regard to an occupier's liability
has not conformed with the modern concepts of legal negligence.13 The
courts have continued to categorize all visiors to premises into tight
compartments. Unlike the latter, they persist in defining a separate
standard of care for each different category.
The addition of the Horton case further complicated the picture,
for had the law been based solely on Indermaur v. Dames, not qualified
by the Horton case, then, although an invitee had been warned by an
occupier of an unusual danger, this would not necessarily have had the
effect of discharging the occupier's liability. The duty would be to exer-
cise reasonable care for the protection of an invitee and it would
be a question for the jury to decide whether the occupier had fulfilled
that duty of care.' 4 If an invitee was warned or otherwise had knowl-
edge of the unusual danger, the danger did not cease to be an unusual
one. The Horton case held that although knowledge of the danger
on the part of the invitee did not prevent the duty from arising, it
had the immediate effect of discharging that duty. Thus if the plaintiff
incurred the risk sciens, he would fail in his action and it would not be
necessary to prove that he incurred it sciens et volens.15 This would
then have the effect of rendering superfluous a consideration of the
application of the maxim volenti non fit injuria to the relationship of
invitor and invitee.16
The Horton case has often been attacked on the ground that even
if the invitee knew and appreciated the danger he should be entitled to
succeed in his action if it could be shown that in all circumstances of
the case he acted reasonably in entering the premises notwithstanding
the existence of the danger.
In the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision of the Campbell1 7 case,
the defendant argued that since the plaintiff had some knowledge of
the wetness on the floor then the condition ceases to be an "unusual
danger". Freedman J.A. said that the plaintiff must have full knowl-
edge and appreciation of the dangers involved for the defendant to say
that the condition was not an unusual danger. Freedman J.A. did not
consider the question as to whether the plaintiff was volens since it was
not even proved that she was sciens. Guy J.A. speaking for the
majority in the Court of Appeal said:
... if danger is usual danger it must be assumed that ordinary, reasonable
people know and appreciate it fully, conversely if they know and appreci-
ate it, it ceases to be unusual.
13 This refers to the concepts which were 'established in the Cases
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562; Norman v. Great Western Riy. Co.
[1915] 1 K.B. 584; Bourhill v. Young [1943] A.C. 92.
14 For a discussion on this point see the Law Reform Committee's Third
Report. Occupiers' Liability to Invitees Licensees and Trespassers. 1954 p. 11,
Section 17.
15 Id. at p. 13.
16 Id. Section 23.
17 (1963), 41 W.W.R. 91; 37 D.L.R. (2d) 725.
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Guy J.A. also said that the invitor shows reasonable care if he (a)
warned the invitee or (b) abates or removes the danger. Thus the
Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the Horton case, as restricted
by Smith v. Austin Lifts Ltd.,1 s that full appreciation of the danger
by the plaintiff will free the invitor of liability.
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court has ruled that "unusual" should
be decided objectively. In the case of Fiddes v. Rayner Construction
Ltd.,19 the court held that "unusual" is not to be construed subjectively
as meaning "unexpected by the particular invitee concerned". Also, it
held that the Supreme Court has never committed itself to the doctrine
that the knowledge of a particular invitee is not a factor in determining
whether a danger is "unusual" or otherwise, and is free to hold to the
contrary.
The British Columbia Supreme Court20 said that knowledge and
full apreciation by the plaintiff of the risk of danger involved would
exonerate the defendant from any liability to her for damage arising
out of the existence of some unusual danger provided the full signifi-
cance of the risk was recognized.
In England, the problem created by the Horton case was resolved
by legislation.21 By an Act of Parliament, the Horton case was reversed
and the occupier is now said to owe a "common duty of care". The
Occupiers' Liability Act states that:
(2) The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will
be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which
he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.
(4) In determining whether the occupier of premises has discharged the
common duty of care to a visitor, regard is to be had to all the
circumstances so that:
(a) where damage is caused to a visitor by a danger of which he had
not been warned by the occupier, the warning is not to be
treated without more as absolving the occupier from liability,
unless in all the circumstances it was enough to enable the
visitor to be reasonably safe.
In the United States, the concept of an "unusual danger" does not
exist. The duty of the occupier is to use reasonable care for the protec-
tion of the invitees.
He must not only warn the visitor of dangers of which he knows, but must
also inspect the premises to discover possible defects. There is no liability,
however, for harm resulting from conditions from which the occupier
did not know and could not have discovered with reasonable care.22
Apparently, nothing more than a warning is ordinarily required yet
the jury may be permitted to find that obviousness, warning or even
knowledge is not enough.
1s [19591 1 All E.R. 81. Here it was decided that full appreciation of the
danger by the plaintiff was necessary to exonerate the occupier of his liability.
19 (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 63.
20 Sanders v. Shauer (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 685.
21 Occupiers' Liability Act 1957.
22 Prosser, Law of Torts, 3rd ed. p. 403.
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It is apparent that the Campbell case did not go so far as to con-
form with the English and American position with regard to the
standard of care owed by an occupier of premises, and it remains to
be seen in future decisions whether the courts will make express that
which the Campbell case implied, namely, that an invitee's knowledge
of the unusual danger will not necessarily discharge the invitor's duty
of care.
Ayoub et al. v. Bense & Beauprd, [1964] S.C.R. 448.
JOHN O'DONOGHUE*
TORT - NEGLIGENCE - STANDARD OF CARE IN USING VOLATILE
SUBSTANCES
This was a case on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Ontario,
which had affirmed a judgment of Aylen, J., The facts are outlined in
the decision of Spence, J. in the Supreme Court of Canada thusly:
Bense, an employee acting in the course of his duty, while draining
the gasoline tank of an automobile preparatory to the removal of the
tank, bumped into a light cord. The extension cord fell and when the
light bulb (which was encased in the standard wire mesh protector)
struck the bottom of the pit, there was a mild explosion. Flames
enveloped the service station and caused damage to the adjacent
property. On these basic facts the Court of Appeal and Aylen, J. had
held that the defendants were not legally liable for the damage to the
adjacent property. Since the reasons for judgment of the lower courts
are not available, one must analyze the situation fully in order to assess
the Supreme Court decision, which reversed the lower courts.
Section 1 of the Accidental Fires Act1 reads:
1. No action shall be brought against any person in whose house or
building or on whose land any fire accidentally begins, nor shall any
recompense be made by him for any damage suffered thereby; but no
contract or agreement made between landlord and tenant shall be hereby
defeated or made void.
In commenting on the Accidental Fires Act, Strong J. in The Canada
Southern Railway Co. v. Phelps2 said:
The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher would be applicable equally to fire, and
every person who built a fire in his house for ordinary domestic purposes
would but for the enactment be bound at his peril to keep it safely, and
liable to his neighbours for any damage which it might cause them,
though no negligence could be imputed. It was only to mitigate this rule
of law that the statute was passed, and it was not intended thereby to
alter the law of liability for negligende.3
*Mr. O'Donoghue is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 R.S.O. 1960 c. 3.
2 (1884), 14 S.C.R. 132.
3 Id. at 145.
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